The political economics of sovereign wealth fund investment by Hawkins, Philip Patrick
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Political Economics of Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philip Patrick Hawkins 
Student No. 462569 
 
Submitted for the degree of Master of International Relations 
University of the Witwatersrand 
 
November 2017 
 
Philip Patrick Hawkins                        University of the Witwatersrand                                              462569 
                                                                                                                                                                           Index  
Philip Patrick Hawkins                        University of the Witwatersrand                                              462569 
                                                                                                                                                                           Index 
Index 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….…..1 
I. International Political Economics Theory: Setting the Perspective…..…………….………3 
 - Liberal IPE Theory……………………….…………………………………...……..5 
 - Economic Nationalism Theory………………………………………………………7 
 - Structuralism in IPE………………………………………………………………….9 
 - Constructivism in International Political Economics……………………………….12 
  Discussion of Theories………………………………………………………………14 
II. The ‘Santiago Principles’…………………………………………………………………17 
III. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Political Distrust: The Rise of Protectionism…………….20 
IV. Identifying Political Influence in Sovereign Wealth Fund Asset Allocation…………….23 
V. Case Study: Chile 2006 – 2009……………………...……………………………………26 
VI. Case Study: China Investment Corporation…...………………………………………....30 
VII. Case Study: Qatar Investment Authority………………………………………………..35 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………....41 
Appendix…………………………………………………………….……………………….46 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………….48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philip	Patrick	Hawkins																								University	of	the	Witwatersrand																																														462569	
	 1	
The Political Economics of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment 
Introduction 
Increasingly over the last 30 years have sovereign wealth fund investments gained 
traction as a viable means by which states can put excess revenue to work, providing the 
prospect for improved returns when compared to more conventional state investment options 
such as gold or foreign currency reserves.  
The growth of the SWF market has been remarkable, rising from an overall 
investment value of 6.215 trillion USD at the end of 2012 to 7.372 trillion USD by July 2016. 
The 1.157 trillion dollar growth through the post-recessive market is truly impressive, 
standing in stark contrast to the declining price of gold over the same period of time. It was 
through the 2008-2009 global economic crisis that SWF investment truly proved its worth as 
a platform for investment, keeping several vulnerable primary commodity exporting states 
afloat while others struggled to maintain solvency. 
Not only did these funds prove invaluable in the economic stabilisation of even the 
most vulnerable states through a prolonged and severe market slump, but that of some state’s 
socio-political integrity too. The connection between the obvious economic and less obvious 
political characteristics of SWF investment began, then, to present itself in a tangible and 
very real way. It quickly became a contentious topic with the realm of international political 
economics as it challenged the status-quo which had dominated the global geopolitical 
balance of power brought about over the course of the industrial revolution, oil boom and rise 
of the global market. This investigation will seek to answer a question that has become 
common place in the study of global SWFs, but remains contended and inconclusive. How do 
SWF investments influence global and/or domestic politics? 
The connection between the investment and divestment actions of SWFs, their asset 
allocation strategies and their effects on domestic and international politics is a relatively 
unpopular concept in the study of international relations. Given the original, purely economic 
function of these investments, it is not entirely surprising that the overwhelming majority of 
materials available focus almost entirely on that aspect. However, some of the world’s 
leading research institutions and industry experts have published papers targeted at the 
analysis of sovereign wealth fund’s roles in international political economics, and it is from 
these resources that this report will draw the base of its information. 
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Through the examination of resources published by renowned sources such as the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute (SWFI), the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-
SWF), the International Forum on Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) and various academic 
journal articles, this report aims to fundamentally establish an irrefutable link between the 
asset allocation of sovereign wealth funds, and the positive and negative impacts on politics 
at both domestic and international levels in the investor and recipient states. 
The scene is set by identifying International Political Economics theory as the 
theoretical basis for the investigation, with particular attention paid to the designation of 
specific IPE theories to each case. Preliminary research has allowed the paper to identify four 
IPE theories most relevant to the research, those being Economic Liberalism, Mercantilism, 
Economic Constructivism and Economic Structuralism. The analysis of the theories will be 
followed by a discussion in which each case will be assigned a theoretical perspective that 
will be used as the basis for the case analysis. 
Next, the paper will discuss the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for 
sovereign wealth fund investment. This is essential in the understanding of the relationship 
between SWF investment and political discourse. 
A short background of political distrust for SWF investment is then given, discussing 
the process of dubious SWF investment practices (particularly before the establishment of the 
IMFs Santiago Principles) which lead to the general Western contempt for SWF investments 
around 2007-2008. 
The final step before the case-by-case study begins is to identify a method by which 
the investigation will categorically identify the presence and extent of political repercussions 
arising from SWF investment both qualitatively and quantitatively. Having completed the due 
diligence required to fully and scientifically analyse the subject, the case study analysis can 
begin. 
This paper will use three key examples to illustrate the possible positive and negative 
effects of sovereign wealth fund investment on domestic and international politics. The first 
case investigates the circumstances under which Chilean domestic politics were heavily 
influenced both directly and indirectly using its Social and Economic Stabilization Fund 
(formerly the Copper Stabilization Fund) to stabilise its economy, and the Pension Reserve 
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Fund to supplement loss of citizen’s income during the 2008-2009 global recession. The 
second case will examine the international political repercussions of the China Investment 
Corporation in the context of accusations arising from blatantly politicised investment 
behaviours, accusations of its use to execute geostrategic goals on behalf of the state and the 
wave of economic protectionism in the West that followed suit. 
The final case study focuses on the Doha-based Qatar investment Authority. The case 
offers valuable insight into the way in which the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
(GAPPs) play a role in the analysis of sovereign wealth fund behaviour in cases where 
signatory states fail to comply with the regulations. It also provides evidence that SWF 
investments can be used to manipulate global politics though third party financing of armed 
conflict as well as the role of SWFs in regional political power dynamics. 
Finally, a conclusion will be presented which will offer evidence derived from each of 
the cases to prove or disprove the hypothesis that sovereign wealth fund investment has the 
ability to influence domestic and international politics. 
I. International Political Economics Theory: Setting the Perspective 
This investigation will use IPE theory as a tool for setting the perspective of the 
investigation into the relationship between sovereign wealth fund investment and political 
discourse. IPE theory attempts to explain international relations using economic 
interconnectedness as the driving force behind international politics and economics. 
Globalization is a major part of IPE theory and is used extensively within the theoretical 
breakdown. 
Robert Griplin explains that IPE theory uses points from Liberal, Marxist and 
Nationalist perspectives on international relations to gain a well-rounded understanding of the 
subject matter1. The primary focus of this theory is to highlight the relationship between 
international economics and international politics as collective primary forces for decision 
making in international relations. 
The main inference of the theory dictates that the international market is the main 
driver of the entire system of international relations and that political change is often 
																																								 																				
1	Robert	Gilpin,	The	Political	Economy	of	International	Relations	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1987).	
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symptomatic of global market activities2. This theory, while still relatively new and rapidly 
developing, has been tested over recent decades and proven its substance. As such it is useful 
in explaining decisions made surrounding SWF investment and economic protectionism. 
The theory can be used in this case to gain a basic understanding of the relationship 
between politics and economics within global international relations and specifically to gain a 
preliminary understanding of the way in which global markets project influence over 
international politics. Of course, SWF investments form part of the global market and are 
some of the largest and most powerful singular independent entities within the entire market 
economy. As such, any information gained on the relationship between the market economy 
and international politics is, for the most part, transferrable to that of SWF investment and 
international politics. 
This study will use IPE theory to guide its perspective and use the main assumptions 
of political and economic interconnectedness to dictate the standpoint of the study from start 
to finish. As such, the global market is assumed to be self-serving in nature in so much as 
each actor seeks primarily to achieve their own political and economic objectives above those 
of any other. The actions of different states may positively or negatively influence those of 
others, and may even influence states unequally, but as long as a state achieves its own 
political or economic objective, that state is neither opposed to nor driven by the relative 
gains of others. 
 Within the greater category of IPE theory, there are multiple theories which offer 
direct assumptions regarding the nature of political economics. This study will discuss four of 
those theories in order to select an appropriate theoretical perspective for each of the three 
case studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
2	Gilpin,	The	Political	Economy	of	International	Relations.	
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Liberal IPE Theory 
One of the main theoretical subdivisions of International Political Economic theory is 
the liberal school of thought. The theory arose as an offshoot of the political and 
philosophical theory of liberalism and is considered a traditional approach to international 
political economics having arisen during the formulation of IPE theory as it is known today 
during the 1970s3. Liberal theories share the basic assumption that people (and therefore 
states) are naturally inclined to cooperate with one another in relationships beneficial to both 
or all parties involved. Liberal (sometimes referred to as pluralist) theory regards the nature 
of international relations and of the state itself to be rational, positing that free trade brings 
peace and stability4. 
When applied to the realm of global economics, liberal theory exhibits itself most 
profoundly in the practice of a global free trade economics. That is to say that there is a 
directly correlative relationship between free trade and the accumulation of wealth among 
states. According to Dr. Peter Hough, associate professor of international politics at London’s 
Middlesex University, this concept derives directly from the father of liberalism himself, 
Adam Smith5. In a 1901 edited publication of Smith’s political and economic literature, an 
excerpt from Smith’s 1776 The Wealth of Nations illustrates the concept of the “invisible 
hand.” In it, Smith explains that in a free market economy there has a natural proclivity to 
work together through the division of labour to achieve optimal efficiency and maximise 
revenue6. While Smith acknowledges that this behaviour may spring from somewhat selfish 
motivations, he posits that trading in a free market economy generates greater revenue for all 
and is therefore ultimately beneficial not only to the buyer and seller but to the market itself7. 
One of the most pertinent aspects of Smith’s liberal theory of international political 
economics is the concept of the ‘invisible hand.’ This analogy likens the forces of the global 
free market economy to that of an invisible hand which moves individual actors to behave in 
a way that will generate the greatest returns which is to cooperate8. The theory advocates for 
																																								 																				
3	Peter	Hough,	“International	Political	Economy	I:	Theory	&	History,”	in	World	politics:	international	relations	
and	globalisation	in	the	21st	Century,	ed.	Pearson	Longman,	(London:	Middlesex	University,	2010),	320-359.	
4	Ronen	Palan,	“New	Trends	in	Global	Political	Economy,”	in	Global	Political	Economy:	Contemporary	Theories,	
ed.	Ronen	Palan,	(Abingdon:	Routledge,	2000),	1-19.	
5	Hough,	“International	Political	Economy	I:	Theory	&	History,”	320-359.	
6	Adam	Smith,	“The	Welth	of	Nations,”	in	An	Inquiry	into	the	Nature	and	Causes	of	the	Wealth	of	Nations,	ed.	
Edwin	A.	Seligman,	(London:	J.	M.	Dent,	1901),	117-118.	
7	Smith,	“the	Wealth	of	Nations,”	1-19	
8	Hough,	“International	Political	Economy	I:	Theory	&	History,”	320-359.	
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the separation of state and market, going on to describe the tendency of governmental over-
regulation and disruption of true market freedom stemming from protectionism. 
Another critical postulation that liberal economic theory presents is that trade results 
in peace. The approach follows that in a capitalist free market economy with investment 
entities looking for stability and predictability as essentials for perceived economic security, a 
state that acts peacefully offers a safer and more attractive environment for investment on all 
scales9. This means that if states were driven by the desire to grow their own economy and to 
retain or attract investment then they would logically be driven to behave peacefully. Hence 
the concept that greater freedom of markets leads to more peaceful international relations 
globally. 
When liberal economic theory is applied to the topic of complex international 
investment models such as sovereign wealth fund investments, one might expect certain 
characteristics to be found. Firstly, according to the theory of the ‘invisible hand’ both 
investor and investee enterprises would be guided in their actions by a set of norms deemed 
acceptable to the global market in order to maximise investment potential. One would 
therefore expect that states that choose to invest in sovereign wealth funds would be largely 
capitalist free market states heavily involved in global trade and transnational commercial 
activities themselves before committing capital on the scale of billions of US dollars to 
international investments. The states and enterprises in which these SWFs invest should be 
similar in nature if not more so in order to attract international investment. 
Secondly, if liberal economic theory holds true then one would also expect for there 
to be a high level of cooperation among the international SWF investor states so as to 
maximise profitability in sectors of weakness through targeted investment in stronger foreign 
industries within that sector. In fact, this is one of the primary incentives for SWF investment, 
known in the industry as diversification. 
Furthermore, liberal economic theory emphasises that in order for a truly free market 
to be achieved and embraced, there must be a separation of government and market. This 
point is rather complex with regards to SWF investments due to the fact that these funds draw 
capital exclusively from government funding and aim absolutely to serve that government. 
Moreover, the fact is that SWF investments are set up by the investor state government from 
																																								 																				
9	Erik	Gartzke,	“The	Capitalist	Peace,”	American	Journal	of	Political	Science	51,	no.	1,	(2007):	169-171.	
Philip	Patrick	Hawkins																								University	of	the	Witwatersrand																																														462569	
	 7	
assigning directives and restraints to actually employing fund managers makes the total 
separation of fund and state all but impossible. That being said, The ‘Santiago Principles’ do 
support maximum separation of state government and the sovereign wealth funds in which 
they invest through the use of independent fund managers, regular external auditing and strict 
regulatory restrictions which prevent government interference. This point will be made clear 
by this paper in the analysis of the ‘Santiago Principles’ in the following chapter. 
Economic Nationalism Theory 
Like liberal economic theory, economic nationalism (also known as mercantilism or 
economic realism) is a derivative of the political and philosophical theory of realism sharing 
its defining perspectives on the nature of statehood and world order within global 
international relations. The theory embraces the link between politics and economic order, a 
sentiment expressed in no uncertain terms by E.H. Carr when he wrote “the science of 
economics presupposes a given political order, and cannot be profitably studied in isolation 
from politics.10” 
Economic nationalism theory gets its name from the hypothesis that national 
government regulation and oversight on domestic and international economic matters 
contributes to stability, success and ultimately greater economic and political gains11. The 
theory depends on this assumption and advocated for greater state control over international 
economic activities. Most importantly, it emphasizes that the state is the highest level of 
authority in international relations, and therefore has authority over all affairs of the state, 
including economic activities. 
One of the principal objectives of the state under economic nationalism is to become 
industrialized to as high a level as possible. This stems from the belief that industry grows 
independence and self-sustainability which plays into the nationalist tenet that states are 
inherently self-interested and therefore must be independent and autonomous12. In addition, 
and perhaps most importantly, nationalists believe that strength of industry directly relates to 
strength of military and military power which is an integral part of nationalist statehood. 
																																								 																				
10	Edward	H.	Carr,	The	Twenty	Years’	Crisis,	1919-1939,	(London:	Macmillan,	1951),	117.	
11	William	C.	Wohlforth,	“Realism,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Relations,	ed.	Christian	Reus	Smith	
and	Duncan	Snidal	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	131-155.	
12	Robert	Gilpin,	The	Political	Economy	of	International	Relations,	31-34.	
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The concept of power dynamics is arguably the foremost idea outlined within 
nationalist economic theory as a whole. The whole idea of nationalism is centered on the 
belief that, with individual states acting as completely self-interested entities, state power and 
the dynamics of state power relative to other states is the driving force behind all political, 
economic and social activities undertaken by the state. Nationalists rely on the concept of 
relative power to base their argument in real world application, using this idea to explicate the 
behavior of heavily militarized states13. 
In an economic application, nationalism theory seeks to explain global trade and 
financial interaction as a means by which to expand power relative to other states, including 
the states with whom these transactions are made. The global balance of power drives states 
to consider every international economic interaction as an opportunity to become more 
economically secure than the next state which in turn allows for the ability to project 
influence over other states (such as those indebted to the acting state) and thus fund a stronger 
military. With greater economic independence while retaining the dependence of other states 
on one’s own economy, nationalist economics can greatly impact the balance of power in 
favor of one state over others. 
To further apply nationalist theory to international economics, one may consider the 
implications of state-control in the sector. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, nationalist 
theory emphasizes the controlling role of the government in the economic sector, particularly 
concerning trade and commerce conducted with other states. The theory realizes that if all 
states were solely self-serving, then the state government must also have power over the 
economy and its dealings on the global market in order to ensure that such dealings were 
being used to pursue the interests of the state14.  
When directly applied to the topic of sovereign wealth fund investments, the theory of 
nationalism in international economics seems at first to hold some degree of validity. The 
funds are financed entirely by state capital, and serve to generate profit and economic 
resilience to the owner state. This is an inarguable point in favor of the presence of a 
fundamentally nationalist characteristic in all sovereign wealth funds. Furthermore, if not 
slightly less definitive, the point that SWF investments do indeed use capital drawn primarily 
or entirely from the sale of manufactured goods or commodities. This continues to 
																																								 																				
13	Gilpin,	The	Political	Economy	of	International	Relations,	31-34.	
14	Robert	O.	Keohane,	“The	Old	IPE	and	the	New,”	in	International	Political	Economy:	Debating	the	Past	Present	
and	Future,	ed.	Nicola	Phillips	and	Catherine	Weaver	(Abingdon:	Routledge,	2011),	35-45.	
Philip	Patrick	Hawkins																								University	of	the	Witwatersrand																																														462569	
	 9	
substantiate the nationalist idea that industrialization is key to the independence and power of 
a state, specifically economic power in this case. 
Lastly, there is the matter of the “Santiago Principles.’ While some may contend that 
the International Monetary Fund’s Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) are 
the so called ‘final nail I the coffin’ for nationalist theory in SWF investment, the truth could 
not be further from the truth. In fact, the GAPPs would indeed prove the absence of solely 
state centric motivations behind SWF investment if they were authoritative and governable 
over all states engaged in the investment class, but this is not the case. In reality, neither the 
GAPPs nor any intergovernmental authority has the right or ability to enforce mandatory 
obedience of the principles without that state’s voluntary recognition and ratification15. And 
so all SWFs, whether belonging to states who have chosen to abide by the principles or states 
who have not, have chosen to do so of their own free will and therefore presumably for the 
overall wellbeing of their nation’s economy. 
There is, however, a stumbling block in the applicability of nationalist economic 
theory to SWF investment. Unambiguously, the ‘Santiago Principles’ state that there should 
be a separation of SWF and state, meaning that aside from its role in setting up the SWF in 
the first place, national government should have as little influence over the SWF as 
possible16. Unless there are other, relatively more economically or politically beneficial 
objectives achievable by the signing of the GAPPs, this point directly contradicts the basis of 
economic nationalism in sovereign wealth fund investment. 
Structuralism in IPE 
The theory of Structuralism in international political economics arose from the desire 
to identify and to qualify the causes behind worldwide financial inequality and state poverty 
in a bipolar global market economy. The theory was developed in the 1950s from the work of 
members of the Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLAC), many of whom being 
lower to middle income states with the inherent social and economic challenges associated 
with debt and economic stagnation17. The term was originally used to explain some of the 
																																								 																				
15	International	Forum	on	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	Generally	Accepted	Principles	and	
Practices:	“Santiago	Principles”	(Santiago:	International	Working	Group	on	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	2008).	
16	International	Forum	on	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	Generally	Accepted	Principles	and	
Practices.	
17	Fabricio	Missio,	Frederico	G.	Jayme	JR.,	and	Jose	L.	Oreiro,	“The	Structuralist	Tradition	in	Economics:	
Methodological	and	Macroeconomics	Aspects,”	Revista	de	Economia	Politica	35,	no.	2	(2015):	247-266.	
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most significant contributing factors leading to damaging inflation rates in Latin America at 
the time. It is generally agreed that structuralism as an applicable theory of international 
political economics was first seen in the manifesto of economist Raul Prebisch in 1949, and 
was later used as reference material during the work of the ECLAC before gaining academic 
distinction18. 
Structuralism, like Marxism, is a class based theory and is in fact rooted in the class 
based system of Marxism. The difference between the two is in the scale and in the 
presumption of causal roles within inter-state relations. Where Marxism seeks to explain 
divisions in class and social structuring, structuralism is not limited to this scope and seeks 
rather to explain the way in which social classes are influenced by economic structures with 
social classes referring to that of states19. In other words, economic structuralism focuses on 
the effect of the structures of international relations on the economic standing and income 
profile of states in order to identify the causes of global income inequality and perpetual debt. 
Economic structuralism offers a holistic approach to the analysis of international 
relations. Unlike many other approaches, this theory believes that the actions of a state cannot 
be considered singularly of its own convictions, but rather a result of the totality of its own 
structures in conjunction with the effects of the collective interdependent international system 
as a whole20. To put it simply, structuralism believes that state markets operate in an 
interconnected web of political, social and economic structures including its own internal 
structures, which all influence the behaviour of that state and collectively influence that of 
other states. 
Ultimately, the idea of structuralism was designed to explain the mechanisms in play 
within the global economic system which lead to economic inequality and disproportionate 
levels of development among states. In doing so, some structuralist economists have found 
that the current global price mechanism in economics is ultimately failing developing and 
underdeveloped states. Dutt and Ros find that this mechanism fails to promote steady growth 
																																								 																				
18	Stephanie	Blackenburg,	Jose	G.	Palma	and	Fiona	Tregenna,	“Structuralism,”	The	New	Palgrave	Dictionary	of	
Economic,	ed.	Steven	N.	Durlauf	and	Lawrence	E.	Blume	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2008).	
19	Lance	Taylor,	Reconstructing	Macroeconomics:	Structuralist	Proposals	and	Critiques	of	the	Mainstream	
(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2004)	
20	William	A.	Jackson,	“Social	Structure	in	Economic	Theory,”	Journal	of	Economic	Issues	37,	no.3	(2003):	727-
746.	
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or induce equilibrium in the flow of capital among and within the world’s economies21. In 
this case, the price mechanism is seen to comprise of a combination of political and economic 
structures (such as the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organisation etc.) which have the 
combined effect of perpetuating underdevelopment through indebtedness, trade regulation 
favourable to developed economies and political interference such as austerity measures 
forced on developing economies. 
A further point of deviation in structuralist theory from orthodox IPE theories is in its 
scope and scale. Structuralism sees global economic interactions as an unavoidably 
interconnected network of historical, current and possible future transactions. In the theory’s 
structure with a global core and periphery of economic activity, the balance of economic 
benefits is in a constantly shifting but intentionally maintained state of non-equilibrium22. 
Importantly, though, with the recognition of these points it becomes possible for historically 
disadvantaged states (such as the Latin American pioneers of structuralist theory) to act in 
opposition of the status quo and improve their economic condition. 
In order to analyse the usefulness of structuralist economic theory to the study of 
sovereign wealth fund investment, one must first conceptually apply the theory to the topic. If 
SWFs conformed completely to structuralist principles then the one would expect some 
critical factors to be evident. Firstly, in accordance with structuralist tenets, the investment 
category must be seen as an international economic structure in itself, interconnected with 
and interactive with other structures and entities around the world. As such, SWF investments 
and the economic network within which they operate must be seen to perpetuate the current 
global economic disequilibria, or at the very least, to be disproportionately advantageous for 
wealthy developed states compared to developing state investors. Furthermore, as an 
economic structure in itself, SWF investments should fail to deliver economic growth and to 
balance income distribution amongst developing states. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
21	Amitava	Dutt	and	Jaime	Ross,	ed.,	Development	Economics	and	Structuralist	Macroeconomics:	Essays	in	
Honor	of	Lance	Taylor	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2003),	55.	
22	Dutt	and	Ross,	Development	Economics	and	Structuralist	Macroeconomics:	Essays	in	Honor	of	Lance	Taylor,	
55.	
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Constructivism in International Political Economics 
The theory of constructivism is one of the newer notions to have emerged in the field 
of international political economics, sometimes referred to as ‘global political economics’ by 
newer texts to reflect the globalised nature of international relations today. Originally coined 
by IR theorist Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in 1989, the theory challenges the so called 
‘traditional’ approaches to international political economics; liberal and realist in particular23. 
The constructivist argument at its most basic level posits that the actions of an 
individual are influenced by a set of combined ideas held by other groups and individuals 
which collectively form the identity of the individual24. In the international political 
economic application of the theory, the individual would become the state and the collective 
would refer to other states and non-state actors within the realm of international relations. 
The constructivist theory in IPE is partially derived from essentially Marxist social 
ideological roots in that it identifies social influences as the primary realm of international 
relations. This however is where it deviates from the traditional theory of Marxism, where its 
causal relationship is directed from the social level towards an effect on the state, as opposed 
to a state’s effect on social classes. In this regard, the constructivist school of thought makes 
four key assumptions about this relationship. Firstly, that the identities and norms of all actors 
in international relations are socially constructed by themselves, their peers and other IR 
actors. Secondly, that the ideas and the values of a state are just as substantive a driving force 
behind the actions of that state as its security or its economy. Third, conflict and cooperation 
are essentially the consequence of the identity of a states beliefs and values in action. Finally, 
the identity and actions of a state may change over time with a change in its values and its 
convictions25. This change may take place in the form of a reactionary evolution in response 
to changing global political or economic climates such as the emergence of globalisation, or 
as a result of local political or economic processes such as a change in state government. 
 
																																								 																				
23	Nicholas	G.	Onuf,	World	of	Our	Making:	Rules	and	Rule	in	Social	Theory	and	International	Relations	
(Columbia:	University	of	South	Carolina	Press,	1989).	
24	Lukas	La	Riviere,	“Towards	a	Constructivist	International	Political	Economy	of	Climate	Change,”	in	Issues	in	
Political	Economy	23,	no.	1	(2014):	90-101.	
25	David	N.	Balaam	and	Bradford	Dillman,	“Alternative	Perspectives	on	International	Political	Economy,”	in	
Introduction	to	International	Political	Economy:	International	Edition,	ed.	David	N.	Balaam	et	al.	(Boston:	
Longman,	2011),	113-114	
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Another aspect of the constructivist idea is the postulation that identity can be 
contextual. Andre Broome finds that the identity of a state may be subject to change within 
differing contextual settings, albeit to a certain extent26. Broom states that one may consider 
the aspects composing the identity of a state as being contextually dominant. This means that 
an actor might perceive its own identity slightly differently under differing circumstances, 
and may therefore seek to achieve different goals as these circumstances evolve. It also 
allows for variability in identity with changing levels of analysis, meaning that an actor’s 
identity may vary from domestic, international, regional and global levels of analysis. These 
are particularly useful characteristics in determining the accuracy of the theory and in its 
theoretical application to real world scenarios. 
The considerable variability of the theory’s contexts and scales makes it widely 
applicable to a variety of actors in international political economics; however, it is also the 
source of debate over its accuracy in determining and forecasting future behaviours. This is 
especially true for contemporary constructivists who have attempted to address inaccuracies 
within the theory’s applicability by adding additional non-material or qualitative categories of 
analysis such as temporality being historical or contemporary, cultural factors influencing 
decision making, ‘emotional’ forces and even the concept of ‘linked ecologies.27’ That being 
said, the broadening of constructivist ideas as a developing contemporary theory has been 
well received among scholars as it has allowed for a deepening of constructivist research 
agendas.  
Overall, the constructivist basis for analysis has proven useful and, while there have 
been some arguably immaterial deviations from the original concept; it has shown its ability 
to embrace change for self-improvement which is critical in this age. 
In the context of this study, the theory must be applied specifically to sovereign 
wealth fund investment. To start with, it would be expected that a fund conforming to 
constructivist behaviour would fundamentally follow the path of its owner state. This is an 
assumption made due to the fact that sovereign wealth funds function primarily to serve its 
owner state. The fund would be expected to behave in a largely predictable manner due to the 
limited scope and variability of its political economic engagements. Unlike a state, a 
sovereign wealth fund is not considered a political actor and should, at least in theory, not be 
																																								 																				
26	Andre	Broome,	“Constructivism	in	International	Political	Economy,”	in	Global	Political	Economy:	
Contemporary	Theories	Second	Edition,	ed.	Ronen	Palan	(Abingdon:	Routledge,	2013),	193-204.	
27	Broome,	“Constructivism	in	International	Political	Economy,”	202.	
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used as political tool. Here, however, is where deviations may be found. States and funds 
compliant with the ‘Santiago Principles’ would be expected to behave more predictably than 
those who do not recognise the GAPPs. 
Unlike traditional positivist theories, the theory of constructivism has no statements of 
certainty as to the behaviours of international actors across the board. As such, the 
determination of applicability of constructivist theory in sovereign wealth fund investment 
would have to take place on a case by case basis. It would, however, be a safe assumption to 
make that SWFs who do not abide by the GAPPs would be more likely to adopt aggressive, 
manipulative or otherwise belligerent practices from their owner states.  
Discussion of Theories 
Within the field of international economic theories, the four selected for analysis in 
this study were chosen based on several criteria. Each of the theories offers valuable insight 
into the specific field of sovereign wealth fund investment, some more so than others. 
Furthermore, each of the theories allows for influence of domestic and international political 
discourse on international economics and therefore by extension its effect on sovereign 
wealth fund investment. In order to determine which theory offers the most productive insight 
for the study, one must first analyse their relevance to each of the chosen SWFs on a case-by-
case basis. 
The first and seemingly most obvious example to analyse should be application of 
structuralist theory to the Chilean case, given the similar economic situation and region of 
Chile to that of the pioneering Latin American states of the theory. In this regard, one of the 
foremost factors to consider is that sovereign wealth funds have become a popular tool 
among developing states for economic stabilisation through income diversification and for 
economic, industrial and infrastructural development initiatives. Considering the fact that the 
theory of structuralism was developed by (and in the context of) a region where we now see 
several sovereign wealth fund investments including Chile, it is not difficult to determine 
relevance. Furthermore, the nature of a sovereign wealth fund in itself is an example of the 
interconnected network of global economic structures, conforming to the structuralist precept. 
These funds are subsidised by state economic bodies, managed by international investment 
corporations which are governed by the regulations of their home states, audited by 
multinational corporations and invest in a multitude of international enterprises, corporations, 
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other states etc. As such, the concept of globally interconnected economic structures is indeed 
personified by the example of a sovereign wealth fund. 
According to structuralist teachings, the globally interconnected network of economic 
structures promotes the maintenance of economic dis-equilibrium in favour of developed and 
wealthy states to the disadvantage of developing or underdeveloped states. This would appear 
not to be the case with the popularity of SWF investments among lower income states and the 
ability for these states to achieve economic stability which is, in fact, relatively more 
beneficial to developing states than developed states. In addition, the ability to employ 
foreign fund management firms allows developing states to take advantage of ‘western’ fund 
managers thereby diminishing the developed state advantage. Adding to the divergence from 
structuralist theory is the fact that a number of sovereign wealth funds have, in fact, proven 
successful in promoting meaningful stability in developing investor states including Chile. As 
such, structuralism does not seem a fitting theoretical basis on which to base the Case study. 
A more fitting theoretical framework for the investigation may be that of economic 
liberalism. One reason for this is that the theory accounts not only for successful and 
advantageous investment in developing states, but for the political motivations and 
repercussions of international investment as well. Liberal economic thought, having been 
based in political theory, is an effective tool for the analysis of positive investment politics 
and, while it may also make extrapolations of global cooperation for collective benefit, it 
allows for a directed investigation of political cooperation in achieving economic benefit. As 
such, the Chilean case will be approached using a combination of liberal economic theory 
and structuralism in order to investigate the dynamics of domestic politics in relation to 
sovereign wealth fund investment. 
The case of China’s CIC presents somewhat of a more challenging example for the 
study. Taking into account the state’s communist political agenda, one may not expect it to 
buy in to the global free market economy to the point of becoming a global leader in 
international trade. The capitalist market economy and communist political rule of modern 
day China has allowed it to generate the highest non-commodity revenue of any state on 
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earth, made even more powerful with the inclusion of a relatively strong commodity market 
and highly industrialised society compared to other states28.  
Immediately, one can eliminate the use of liberal economic theory in the investigation 
simply because Chinese politics and economics have rarely, if ever, shown signs of liberal 
behaviour. There is little evidence to suggest that the state or its sovereign wealth funds have 
exhibited a natural proclivity for cooperative economics as dictated by the theory of the 
invisible hand discussed earlier. Nor have there been studies showing the devotion to ethical 
investment practices and, in fact, preliminary investigation on the topic would suggest that 
the opposite is true and will be further discussed in the specific case study to follow. 
Constructivist economic theory, too, seems less than valuable to the investigation of 
this case. The four pillars of constructivist economics essentially focus on the idea that the 
economic actions of a state are defined by the fulfilment of its identity as judged by itself and 
its peers. With controversially differing political and economic identities in the state of 
China, it is difficult to postulate that the activities of the Chinese sovereign wealth funds is 
dictated by its perceived identity. 
Structuralist economic theory initially appears somewhat more fitting to this case. The 
theory is centred on a class based society as seen most similarly in Marxist politics, but also 
to a large extent in Chinese communism. Additionally, China boasts one of the world’s 
largest and most powerful economies with income generated from both commodity and non-
commodity sources, including massive amounts of heavy industry. Structuralist economic 
theory seeks to explain the financial imbalance skewed in favour of developed states through 
the unequal benefit of international financial institutions. In this case, the Chinese sovereign 
wealth funds may be seen as part of the network of financial institutions which the theory 
believes contribute to the perpetuation of income inequality in middle and lower income 
states. With preliminary investigation suggesting that the CIC and its smaller compatriot 
sovereign funds may, in fact, act in aggressive economic activities outside of the acceptable 
range by the GAPPs, this case may benefit from the use of Structuralist economic perspective 
in achieving accurate results.  
 
																																								 																				
28	“Country	Comparison:	Exports,”	cia.gov,	accessed	August	01,	2017.	
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2078rank.html.	
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Most befitting of Chinese economic activities would logically be that of mercantilist 
economic theory (also known as economic nationalism). The theory accounts for the 
economic aggression of Chinese markets in the pursuit of relative gains. As the investigation 
will reveal, the CIC and its partner SWFs would initially appear to behave in accordance with 
the theoretical tenets. China is highly industrialised, allowing for competitiveness in global 
trade through almost unmatchable cost competitiveness in the manufacturing sector. The 
creation of financially powerful SWFs can be interpreted as an extension of the concept, 
allowing for the use of its non-commodity income to attain assets across the globe for further 
economic expansion and the ability to project geostrategic influence. It is for these reasons 
that economic nationalist theory has been selected as the primary theoretical basis for the 
Chinese case study in this paper. 
The remaining case, Qatar, is far more straight-forward in the identification of 
appropriate theoretical application for this study, primarily due to its history of mostly 
uniform political and investment practices. Additionally, its unwillingness to waiver to 
international pressure to increase its SWF transparency in accordance with the Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices suggest that they benefit from activities outside of or 
directly opposing the guidelines of the GAPPs. With the state’s unwillingness to comply with 
GAPP regulation, current and historical political crises over relations with Iran and radical 
Islamists and its economic aggression in SWF investment, the case fits most appropriately 
with the theory of economic Mercantilism.  
II. The ‘Santiago Principles’ 
In October 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF) published a report outlining a list 
of 24 ‘Generally Accepted Principles and Practices’ (GAPPs) intended to set standards by 
which investments in SWFs should be made and managed29. At the time, the IWG-SWF 
represented the collective effort of some of the world’s largest and most powerful sovereign 
wealth funds as well as input from some of the world’s leading authorities in the field. These 
principal funds became the first signatories to the GAPPs. 
																																								 																				
29	International	Forum	on	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	“Generally	Accepted	Principles	and	Practices:	“Santiago	
Principles,”	ifswf.org,	2008/accessed	July	21,	2017.	
http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf.	
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The principles can essentially be divided into three key topics which each highlight a 
different area of SWF investment. Firstly, the ‘Santiago Principles’ offer a set of principles 
suggested for the coordination of legal frameworks, macroeconomic policies and objectives 
of sovereign wealth fund investment. Definitively separate from these, several of the 
principles regard SWF governance structures and institutional legal frameworks. Finally, the 
remaining set of principles concern the actual investment activities and risk management 
profiles30. The GAPPs follow a general legal narrative derived from common financial and 
economic best practices generally (by not always formally) agreed upon by investor states 
and investment institutions. The focus is primarily on transparency and accountability 
determined by the GAPPs, monitored by external auditing regimes and enforceable by law.  
The ‘Santiago Principles’ serve to guide international sovereign wealth fund 
investment to facilitate global economic market stability and to protect states in which SWFs 
invest by focusing compliance on complete disclosure and strict regulation. Additionally, the 
principles encourage SWF investments to foster open and stable market climates by reducing 
protectionist pressure from investor state governments31. It is for these reasons that the 
International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds advocates for the separation 
between state and fund, so as to prevent state government from implementing protectionist 
policy regulations over SWF investments to protect or promote their own markets thereby 
closing such markets off to foreign investment. 
Despite what seems to be a positive step towards responsible investment, the topic of 
GAPP compliance has become one of contention. Being that no economic institute has the 
power to impose enforceable rules on a state without signed consent, the ‘Santiago 
Principles’ are entirely voluntary and have no power over states who choose not to recognise 
the GAPPs. That being said, many SWF investor states have chosen to sign their respective 
funds on to the GAPPs. There are, on the other hand, states that outwardly refuse to sign on 
to the GAPPs and others that choose not to abide by the guidelines for best practice offered 
despite having signed on. More often than not, these states’ SWFs choose not to participate 
for the reason that they do not abide by the GAPPs at least to a degree. Additionally, the 
transparency demanded by the principles is often seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the 
																																								 																				
30	Chilean	Ministry	of	Finance,	“What	are	the	Santiago	Principles?”	www.hacienda.cl,	accessed	July	12,	2017,	
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/frequently-asked-questions/what-are-the-santiago-
principles.html.	
31	Sven	Behrendt,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	and	the	Santiago	Principles:	Where	do	They	Stand?	(Beirut:Carnegie	
Endowment	Middle	East	Centre,	2010),	2-16.	
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state and its right to self-determination in international investment, notwithstanding the fact 
that the sovereign wealth fund is not technically an extension of government but rather an 
extension of state capital which ultimately belongs to the citizens of the home state32. 
The importance of transparency in SWF investment is emphasised in the GAPPs 
because it is seen as a key pillar for responsible and ethical investment practices. 
Transparency is fundamental in the establishment of accountability in the fund and helps to 
legitimise its decisions and actions not only to the citizens to whom it belongs but to the 
global economic community at large. For this reason, the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
uses an SWF’s degree of transparency as an indication of GAPP compliance and by 
association, a function of good economic governance. The SWFI uses the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index to quantify a sovereign wealth fund’s transparency on a scale of 1 to 
1033. This method of indexing SWF transparency was developed at the SWFI by Carl 
Linaburg and Michael Maduell in 2008 and has since become the standard measure of 
transparency for all SWF investment reports worldwide. The Index uses a simple positive 
point allocation for meeting each of a set of ten basic principles of transparency, with the 
minimum score to be considered adequately transparent being 8/1034. 
This paper uses the GAPPs as a benchmark for best practice in sovereign wealth fund 
investment, analysing the way in which each case study behaves in alignment or contrary to 
its teachings. This will allow for a more holistic approach to the investigation of the effects of 
SWF investment on political discourse within investor states and between investor and 
investee states. The GAPPs bare particular relevance to the study of the CIC and QIA where 
the focus pertains specifically to the use of SWF investment in achieving political objectives, 
in addition to the notorious absence of political transparency in government identifiable in 
each of the states. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
32	Behrendt,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	and	the	Santiago	Principles:	Where	do	They	Stand?	2-16.	
33	“Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Rankings,”	swfinstitute.org,	accessed	July	06,	2017.	
http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/.	
34	“Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Rankings,”	swfinstitute.org.	
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III. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Political Distrust: The Rise of Protectionism 
Until the creation of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPPs), 
sovereign wealth funds were seen largely as a threat to sovereignty, national security and the 
global open market as a whole. This view was most prominent around 2007-2008 among 
‘Western’ states who had historically held the minority share of total assets under sovereign 
wealth fund management, vastly outweighed by the billions of dollars in assets controlled by 
the oil exporting Arab states35.  
This was the period in which the credibility of sovereign wealth fund investment was 
most challenged, spurred on by a wave of investments and attempted investments to move 
‘Western’ assets into Arab hands. There was a real perception of threat towards Western 
state’s national security, nowhere more so than in the USA whose media and political 
leadership did little to relieve these concerns. 
In a testimony given at the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
senior research fellow Alan Tonelson representing the USBIC/EF (United States Business 
and Industry Council / Educational Foundation) presented in no uncertain terms the threat 
perceived by the over 1,500 USBIC member companies for foreign (mainly Russian and 
Arab) sovereign wealth fund’s ability to project political influence through large scale 
investment36. Tonelson uses emotive language in his testimony, comparing sovereign wealth 
fund supporters to “teenagers who have begun to start driving under the influence, and brag 
that they’re still alive,” and goes on to recommend that “government must provide the adult 
supervision.37” Unfortunately, emotive rhetoric such as this is a common tool used by SWF 
critics, intended to undermine the highly complex issues surrounding SWF investment for a 
(self-admitted) lack of comprehensive understanding or assumption thereof in those to whom 
the statement is directed. 
Tonelson, despite the more emotive than informative style of his testimony, does raise 
some pertinent issues surrounding the threat that SWF investment may pose to a recipient 
state’s national security and its sovereignty. One example he uses is a proposed scenario in 
																																								 																				
35	Benjamin	J.	Cohen,	“Sovereign	wealth	funds	and	national	security:	the	Great	Tradeoff,”	International	Affairs	
85,	no.	4,	(2009):	713–731.	doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00824.x.	
36	Alan	Tonelson,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	Adversely	Impact	National	Security,	Testimony	to	U.S.	–	China	
Economic	and	Security	Review	Commission,	(Washington	D.C.:	United	States	Government	Publishing	Office	
2008).	https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/08_02_07_tonelson_statement.pdf	
37	Tonelson,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	Adversely	Impact	National	Security.	
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which he hypothesises that a large scale Chinese investment into strategic U.S. sectors may 
alter U.S foreign policy on Taiwanese independence to become more favourable towards the 
Chinese argument in order to preserve its investments as a host state38. In the same year, 
Law360 (a popular and by all accounts reliable public source) reported that US concerns 
included the possibility that ‘rival’ states may seek to obtain ownership of strategic U.S. 
assets for the purposes of corporate, military or scientific espionage in order to identify or 
create flaws in the host state’s national security, corporate governance or even political 
operations39. 
At the time, the intricacies of sovereign wealth fund investment and its relationship to 
political discourse were far less studied, having truly only become a thoroughly detailed 
science in the years following the global economic recession. In 2007 and early 2008, a ‘fear 
of the unknown’ was still a major factor in the realm of SWF investment due to the 
recognition of the financial and implicit political influence granted this investment by virtue 
of their sheer monetary size.  Concerns over the political and geo-strategic capabilities of the 
funds were echoed in seminal articles at the time by professors Ronald Gilson and Curtis 
Milhaupt40 as well as Sven Behrendt’s article on global politics surrounding Arab SWFs.41. 
Gilson and Milhaupt draw attention to metaphors made by SWF critics who use 
‘colourful’ language to disguise real contemporary issues in SWF investment intensions. 
They state outright that there is inevitably a link between SWF investments and political 
discourse using a quote from seminal international political economic author Keynes in their 
opening remarks. The article goes on to an in depth analysis of current (at the time) concerns 
and flaws within the architecture on this investment category, and relate the behaviour of 
SWF investment to new Mercantilism in the modern financial sphere. The authors 
characterise sovereign wealth fund investments as being “neo-Mercantile” in their behaviour, 
using “company-level” practices in order to generate “country-level” economic and political 
benefits42. The article concludes by highlighting the current (at the time) lack of regulation in 
																																								 																				
38	Tonelson,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	Adversely	Impact	National	Security.	
39	Peter	Heyward,	“Are	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	a	Threat?”	law360.com,	2008,	accessed	November	5,	2016.	
https://www.law360.com/articles/51669/are-sovereign-wealth-funds-a-threat.	
40	Ronald	J.	Gilson	and	Curtis	J.	Milhaupt,	“Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	and	Corporate	
Governance:	A	Minimalist	Response	to	the	New	Mercantilism,”	Stanford	Law	
Review	60,	no.	5	(2008):	1345–1370.	
41	Sven	Behrendt,	“When	Money	Talks:	Arab	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	in	the	Global	Public	Policy	Discourse,”	
Carnegie	Papers	12,	(2008),	accessed	October	29,	2016.	
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/arab_sovereign_wealth_funds.pdf.	
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SWF investment, suggesting that this is in-fact the real root of popular concerns and negative 
sentiment towards the investments43. 
Behrendt addresses similar sentiments, but rather than applying the theory of neo-
Mercantilism to the problem, he hypothesises that it is not the size of sovereign wealth funds 
that are of concern, but their sudden rise to prominence44. This is an important point to make 
as it is so rarely recognised that so much of the distrust for SWF investments and their 
motives is founded not in their past actions or in cases which have proven them to be hostile 
towards the west, but from the simple fact that they were a largely unknown entity in the 
world of international investment. The article shows how states began to institute 
economically protective policies to regulate incoming SWF investment despite the plans by 
the IMF and International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds to create a similar 
body of regulations (which would become the GAPP/Santiago Principles). This trend then 
lead to concerns over financial protectionism which goes against the fundamental principles 
of a global open market and free trade economy for which many of the guilty states 
themselves had advocated for so many decades45. 
While both of these articles date back to 2008, they offer essential insight into the 
causes of increased economic protectionist policies at the time. This concept is key in 
understanding the extent of the link between sovereign wealth fund investment and political 
discourse. It illustrates how negative sentiment arose among ‘Western’ states as a result of 
suspicion towards the motivation behind ‘poorer’ state’s investments into their economies as 
it challenged the existing power dynamics of the global market at the time. 
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IV. Identifying Political Influence in Sovereign Wealth Fund Asset Allocation 
International economics was forever changed in the early 1950s with the conceptual 
shift from individual security selection to Markowitz’s Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
which introduced the notion of asset allocation for maximised financial returns as a function 
of investment risk46. Modern day investment still uses largely the same method of asset 
allocation, albeit refined and updated versions derived from MPT and the contemporary 
global investment culture of today.  
In the late 20th century, David Swensen formulated the Yale Model of investment, 
advocating investment in alternative asset classes such as hedge funds, endowments, 
managed futures and credit derivatives47. The resulting rise of the alternative investment class 
and risk-adjusted investment strategies on the global open market made sovereign fund 
investment a viable and attractive alternative to ‘traditional’ investment classes such as 
foreign currency reserves or gold.  
It is for this reason that the number of sovereign wealth fund investments has grown 
from just 23 in January 2000 to 78 active funds by December 201648. There has been a wave 
of negative sentiment and distrust towards SWF investments during the 21st century, and 
particularly prior to the 2008-2009 global economic recession. It is from the arguments 
driven by these negative sentiments that one can decipher a common pattern of political 
concern surrounding SWF investments. 
The CATO Institute’s Daniel J. Ikenson investigates some of these concerns in his 
article (written at a time when concerns were peaking) titled Nothing to Fear but Fear 
Mongers Themselves: A Look at the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate49. Ikenson highlights 
concerns and quotes statements of some SWF sceptics from the New York Times to Leo 
Gerrard (Boss - United Steelworks), to Democratic Party representative Paul Kanjorski 
whose concerns all revolve around IPE issues of sovereign wealth fund investments and their 
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impact on the USA and on the ‘global West’ as a whole. Some of these concerns revolve 
around the assumption that SWF investments from states such as China, Russia and the 
Middle East derive excess revenue through economically dubious practices such as currency 
manipulation50. Furthermore, ‘foreign’ SWF investments are accused of undercutting 
Western businesses in order to devalue the economic entities to the point where the hostile 
SWFs can then purchase them at a fraction of the price while simultaneously hijacking their 
consumer base51. 
By February 2008 the total sovereign wealth fund split of assets under management 
was heavily skewed towards states outside of the ‘global West.’ At the time, out of the total 
market size estimate of 2093 – 2968 billion USD, the ‘global west’ only claimed 490 billion 
USD. Of the remaining market share, Middle Eastern states claimed 909.5 – 1534.5 billion 
USD, Asian states claimed 606.5 – 836.5 billion USD, Russia claimed 125 billion USD and 
the cumulative value of assets under SWF management of the remaining developing states 
totalled 33.3 billion USD52. 
Indeed, these statistics posed a concern for western states that feared the growing 
financial power of states deemed to be a threat, especially considering that Middle Eastern 
states held 43.45% - 51.7% of total SWF assets under management53. Further exaggerating 
tensions was the case of the failed acquisition of several US ports by Middle Eastern 
logistical investment corporation, Dubai Ports World, less than 2 years prior. 
In 2006, Dubai Ports (DP) World initiated a deal to attain controlling shares in the UK 
based company Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) which was then 
contracted with the operation of several U.S. ports54. According to Dixon, even though the 
United States Committee on Foreign Investment had authorised DP World’s acquisition of 
P&O and its contractual obligations, several members of the U.S. Congress brought up major 
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concerns for national security implicated by the deal. When the argument was made, P&O 
was a British owned and therefore foreign corporation and, like DP World, was based in a 
foreign but U.S. allied state. Nevertheless, the members of the U.S. Congress made clear their 
intentions to put forward a congressional bill to impede the action which would result in the 
Arab state’s management of U.S. ports55. In an announcement on the 11th of December 2006, 
DP World stated that it had concluded a transaction which saw 100% of the shares from the 
P&O Ports North America deal sold to a subsidiary of AIG Global Investment Group, 
thereby returning control of these ports to ‘Western’ hands56.   
Although DP World is not a sovereign wealth fund in form or function, it is a state-
owned corporation which made investment in the same way as a SWF would, and as such has 
been used extensively throughout the industry as an example of geopolitics in state sponsored 
international investment. In this case, DP World appears to be the victim of a generalised 
view of Middle-Eastern hostility towards the U.S. as a result of the ‘war on terror’ and the 
emotive and sensational U.S. media and political coverage thereof.  
These examples are mere glimpses into the way in which sovereign wealth fund 
investment and politics are constitutionally intertwined and allow for the determination of 
two main categories and two sub categories one can use in order to determine a pattern of 
SWF influence on domestic and international politics. 
The two main categories refer to the scale of influence, being on either a domestic or 
an international level. The two sub categories refer to the direction of influence, the first 
being the influence of domestic or international politics on SWF investment and the second 
being the influence of SWF investment on domestic or international politics, or a causal vs. 
resultant influence. In order for a causal influence to be present, the case must possess 
evidence of political motivation for SWF investment in order to achieve political, social, 
economic or geostrategic goals of the fund’s owner state. 
The analysis will use this method in order to identify the political aspect of sovereign 
wealth fund investment. It will be applied to the two main case studies of the research 
resulting in a clear understanding of the way in which these cases display the subject matter. 
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V. Case Study: Chile 2006 - 2009 
The global economic recession of 2008-2009 was one of the most favourable turning 
points in the history of SWF investment globally. During a time of massive commodity price 
and currency value fluctuation, stabilisation funds proved their worth all over the world, 
having been accredited as one of the leading factors in the retention of economic stability in 
several primary commodity economies. Chile’s Social and Economic Stabilisation Fund 
(SESF) and Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) were not only one of the newest of such funds, but 
one of the most controversial in their conception.  
According to the Central Intelligence Agencie’s World Factbook and the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, Chile initiated 2 SWF investments between 2006 and 2007, the larger 
of which being the Social and Economic Stabilisation Fund (SESF) with an initial investment 
of US$2.58 billion (1.4% of GDP) and current value of US$14.72 billion (5.9% of GDP57)58. 
During the early 2000s immediately prior to the global financial crisis, South American states 
began implementing counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies in an effort to counteract the 
negative effects of fluctuating primary commodity prices which made up the bulk of many of 
these states sources of revenue59. 
Having ascended to the presidency in 2006, President Michelle Bachelet took 
leadership over a state in financial, social and political turmoil. One of the first items to cross 
her desk would be the passing and adoption of the ‘Fiscal Responsibility Law’ (FRL) which 
would legislatively dictate that the new president would have to publicly present their fiscal 
policies within 90 days of taking office60. Based on the FRL, Bachelet announced the 
initiation of the two new sovereign wealth funds, the Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) and the 
Social and Economic Stabilisation Fund (SESF) which would absorb and replace the 
unremarkably performing Copper Stabilisation Fund (CSF) created in the 1980s. The SESF 
and PRF differ from the CSF in that they are true sovereign wealth funds, offering the 
following benefits.  
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Each of the new funds operates under completely different legislative procedures 
which allow for far more structured financial investment, superior oversight, improved 
accountability and more stringent withdrawal regulations to avoid inappropriate expenditure. 
The funds are also managed independently of government to minimise the risk of 
inappropriate political influence or manipulation. Furthermore, the fund’s investment 
approach allows for low risk investment to grow public pensions, while simultaneously 
engaging in higher level risk-adjusted investments in sectors outside of the copper industry 
enabling the state to engage in economic diversification without jeopardising the public 
pension. Another benefit which cannot be overstated is the ability to engage with 
international experts and other funds facing the same challenges in order to harness local 
expertise through international participation of International Forum on Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (IFSWF) which is exclusively open to SWF owner states and their representatives. 
On the 29th of November 2006 President Michelle Bachelet, accompanied by finance 
minister Andres Velasco, announced her office’s fiscal and macroeconomic policy including 
the allocation of surplus finances towards the two newly established sovereign wealth fund 
investments61. The financial restructuring, however, was not well received. 
Between December 2006 and July 2008, public ratings polls showed a massive 22% 
decline in positive public sentiment towards the Bachelet administration’s economic 
governance. Appendix A graphically represents that negative sentiment rose by 11% and 
neutrality by 19% over the same period62. 
During that time, Bachelet and her administration also faced socio-political challenges 
surrounding endemic corruption on all levels of the government, extensive student protests 
over quality and accessibility of government subsidised education and intra-party divisions 
which ultimately lead to defection and a loss of majority representation in the state senate63. 
The strife continued with crippling labour strikes and lengthy disputes over fair wage. Public 
criticism of massive budgetary allocations to the new SWFs were generally centred around 
the perception that SWF expenditure would be better utilised in addressing immediate socio-
economic challenges such as poverty, income inequality and general ideas of more prudent 
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expenditure in the context of a developing economy64. Despite negative popular sentiment 
towards its countercyclical fiscal policy during 2008 when copper prices spiked accounting 
for nearly 9% of total GDP, the Bachelet regime and Chile’s central bank exhibited 
exemplary fiscal discipline in sticking to its financial policy65.  
In the same year as the start of the global recession and the same year in which public 
support for president Michelle Bachelet’s economic management  had declined  to only 29% 
from 51% I just 18 months, the capital was host to the IMF, IWGSWF and several of the 
most prominent sovereign wealth fund experts and economic instructions in the world. It was 
at this meeting that the GAPPs were first established, hence the name ‘Santiago principles66.’ 
The arrival and passing of the 2008-2009 global economic recession contributed 
greatly to the improvement of public sentiment towards the perceived value of sovereign 
wealth fund investment particularly in primary commodity exporting states. During that time, 
the Chilean government was able to draw from the Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund, 
investing it back into the state’s usable budget to supplement its drastically stunted copper 
income thereby preserving its mining industry and having a stabilising effect on its local 
economy and its exchange rate67. Bachelet’s government also authorised the withdrawal of 
millions of dollars from the Pension Reserve Fund to stabilise income regression through 
government social grants and pension payments, buffering its citizens (the most economically 
vulnerable in particular) from the effects of the recession68. 
According to the CIA’s World Factbook and the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, in 
addition to more recent research conducted by Privos Capital, the copper dependent Chilean 
economy fared exceptionally well through the global economic recession of 2008-2009 
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compared to other primary commodity reliant developing states69. The successful economic 
management of the Chilean government through the recession was quickly recognised even 
during the event. Appendix A shows a spike in public sentiment towards the Bachelet 
administration’s economic management of 26% in just over one year from October 2008 to 
November/December 200970. During 2008 Chile went from having an account surplus in 
excess of 6.07 billion USD to a deficit exceeding 1.37 billion USD, a factor which most 
likely contributed to the surge in negative sentiment towards the Bachelet administration’s 
economic governence71. 
Several of the prominent articles cited in this chapter credit the positive public 
sentiment towards the Bachelet administration to its policy of good economic governance 
through transparency and accountability, in addition to prudent withdrawal from its sovereign 
wealth funds and subsequent allocation of capital assets to threatened sectors both socially 
and economically. Bachelet was unable to run for a second term as the Chilean constitution 
prevents the service of consecutive terms. In 2010 President Bachelet became the Under-
Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women until 2014 when she returned to run 
for a second (non-consecutive) term in the Chilean presidency, and won72.  
The re-election of president Bachelet, as in any democratic election, is a direct and 
unequivocal link between public support and domestic political governance. By identifying 
this link in Chile in which SWF investment had an effect (first negatively and then positively) 
on public sentiment, that link can then be drawn between public sentiment, voter support, and 
domestic politics thus linking SWF investment to domestic politics via public sentiment and 
therefore voter support.  
In terms of the designation of a link between the political aspects of the Chilean case 
of SWF investment, the main category of scale is clearly one of domestic influence. The 
absence of evidence pertaining to any kind of political motivation behind the Chilean SWF 
investment, but presence of evidence that the investment did in fact have an effect on 
domestic politics means that the subcategory for this investment would be a resultant one. As 
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such, this case presents an example of a domestic resultant relationship between sovereign 
wealth fund investment and political discourse. 
VI. Case Study: China Investment Corporation 
The China Investment Corporation (CIC) is one of the largest and most powerful 
sovereign wealth funds in the world with an initial capital capacity of 200 billion USD 
(5.63% of GDP) growing to a present value of 813.8 billion UDS (7.26% of GDP73)74. The 
fund was initiated in 2007 drawing initial funds from a portion of the US$ 1.4 trillion in 
foreign currency reserves. The CIC now derives its capital from excess’ in foreign exchange 
on the international market, making it the largest non-commodity sovereign wealth fund on 
earth, with its present value exceeded only by the oil based Government Pension Fund Global 
of Norway75.  
The corporation’s governance and operations are split between three subsidiaries. 
Created in 2011 China Investment Corporation International (CIC International) invests and 
manages the CIC’s overseas investments in public and private equities, bonds, hedge funds, 
real-estate co-investment partnerships and minority shareholder investments76. In 2015 the 
CIC initiated a second subsidiary, CIC Capital, to work alongside CIC International. CIC 
Capital specialises in direct investments in long term risk adjusted assets on an international 
scale, further refining the CIC’s investment portfolio. These two subsidiaries invest and 
manage the majority of the CIC funds. The third subsidiary is Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
(CHI) which handles the entire domestic investment portfolio of the China Investment 
Corporation77.  
The CIC Mandate does not specifically mention its position on political or 
geostrategic investment strategies or investment in strategic sectors of foreign or domestic 
entities with the intention of gaining privileged information not available to the public. In 
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2008 the president of the CIC, Gao Xiping, stated publically that the CIC had no intention to 
gain representation on the boards of strategic corporations and that the CIC was mandated 
only to act as a passive role-player in its investments78. By 2013 the CIC had gained chairs on 
no fewer than 4 boards of US corporations involved on varying degrees in sectors deemed to 
be strategic or sensitive. 
Indeed the CIC has been involved in numerous deals which analysts and industry 
experts have deemed dubious or suspicious, most of which have been disputed by the CIC 
who maintain that the fund upholds a strict code of ethics in its investments and investment 
management. As such, the governance structures of the fund come into question. The 
question most often reverts to the issue of accountability in the planning, execution and 
management of the funds overseeing bodies. At first glance, however, these structures do 
appear up to the global sovereign wealth benchmark for corporate governance. Figure A 
shows the chain of governance within the CIC. 
Figure A: China Investment Corporation Governance Structure79 
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 One of the primary points of debate within SWF investment is the 
presence of political bias in international investment or home bias in domestic investment. 
Home bias refers to the proclivity for the state to offer favourable investment terms for the 
investment of its own SWF in domestic assets. It is this home bias that has been a continuing 
criticism for the China Investment Corporation80.  
 Of more concern to the international community (the USA in particular) 
are the international investment motives and strategies of the CIC. The first instance of 
blatant, purely political motive in China’s sovereign wealth fund investment policy took 
place shortly after the inception of the China Investment Corporation. In 2008 evidence came 
to light that the CIC had made a deal with the government of Costa Rica that went entirely 
against the values and principles of responsible sovereign wealth fund investment practices. 
A somewhat secret Chinese investment agency called SAFE offered to buy 300 million USD 
worth of government bonds in the relatively poor South American state in return for the 
Costa Rican government severing ties with the disputed territory of Taiwan81.  
 The transaction (often referred to as a bribe) drew the international eye as 
worries mounted over the permeation of politically manipulative practices into the CIC. Both 
SAFE and the CIC drew funds from the same Chinese foreign exchange reserves (around 2 
trillion USD worth at the time) and both were mandated to make investments strategically to 
promote the greater interests of the Chinese state. With its ability to make larger scale 
investments directly in foreign corporations, the CIC added a new dimension to the ability of 
the Chinese state to project its influence into the world’s major financial, strategic, 
technology and military institutions. These concerns were multiplied when CIC president 
Gao Xiqing confirmed that CIC long term investments may have a political component but 
denied the use of CIC investment as a directly political tool, distancing himself from the 
actions of SAFE82. 
																																								 																				
80	Christopher	Balding,	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds:	The	New	Intersection	of	Money	and	Politics	(Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2012).	
81	U.S.-China	Economic	and	Security	Review	Commission,	2008	Report	to	Congress	of	the	U.S.-China	Economic	
and	Security	Review	Commission,	110th	Congress,	2nd	Session	(Washington	D.C.:	U.S.	Government	Printing	
Office,	2008).	
82	U.S.-China	Economic	and	Security	Review	Commission,	2008	Report	to	Congress	of	the	U.S.-China	Economic	
and	Security	Review	Commission.	
Philip	Patrick	Hawkins																								University	of	the	Witwatersrand																																														462569	
	 33	
 It is not only the US that feels threatened by the increasing prominence of 
Chinese economic encroachment into the world’s largest corporations throughout all sectors 
of the economy. The BBC World Service conducted public opinion surveys regarding 
sentiment towards Chinese growth in the top Chinese investment receiving states globally. 
Appendix B is a graphical representation of the findings compared to global Chinese 
investment between 2005 and 2013. 
 When analysing the graph, one can see an interesting pattern emerging. 
Appendix B shows that negative sentiment has risen in each of the sample states as the 
amount of Chinese investment has risen. Among the top states to receive Chinese 
investments, two (U.S.A. and Canada) show mostly negative public sentiment towards 
Chinese investment with more than 50% negativity.  
Negative sentiment was largely believed to be the result of an increase in CIC strategic 
investments in major corporations around the world. The common practice, despite Gao 
Xiqing’s 2008 statement to the contrary, appeared to be an initial capital investment to 
purchase large but minority shares in these corporations before placing representatives from 
either the CIC or Chinese government into high level positions with board membership. One 
such example is that of the major U.S. energy corporation AES. In December 2011, the CIC 
had purchased a 15% share of the corporation and gained the right to appoint a board 
member. The CIC appointed Zhang Guobao. Unlike previous appointments, Guobao was not 
part of the CIC, but rather a bureaucrat in the Chinese administration serving at the time as 
vice chairman of the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission83. 
 Not only did this cast doubt on the true objectives of the CIC, but 
combined with the unashamedly political nature of the SAFE Corporation’s conditional 
investment in Costa Rican government bonds, the entire nature of Chinese foreign direct 
investment came into question.  
 More recently, the China Investment Corporation has been embroiled in 
controversies regarding widespread corruption and misspending within its governing 
structures and its investment practices. According to the Financial Times, the CIC was 
accused by the National Audit Office (NAO) (The national independent auditing firm 
entrusted with the annual audit of the CIC) of incurring “unquantified losses” on international 
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investments due to financial mismanagement in the 2013/2014 financial year84. The 
following year, the CIC once more received a poor review from the NAO, once again 
accused of misappropriation of funds and use of CIC funds for personal expenditure85. 
 Considering the fact that the CIC scores highly on the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index with a score of 8/10 in addition to the apparently well-structured design 
of audited fund governance, the findings of this case study are somewhat surprising86. Since 
its initiation, the China Investment Corporation has been part of one suspicious transaction 
after another. The scale and frequency of these transactions has led to another, secondary 
effect brought on by the investment activity of the CIC. 
 As early as 2012, the CIC had started to notice the effects of Western 
state’s diminishing willingness to conduct business with the state investor. CIC.UL chief Lou 
Jiwei speaking at the 2012 Communist Party Congress stated in an interview with Reuters 
that the CIC felt that there was a disproportionate level of scrutiny placed on the CIC and its 
subsidiaries as compared to other investors and that they had noticed increased concern in 
most Western states when major investments were made87. By 2016, U.S. (and other Western 
states) investment and trade protectionism had hit an all-time high, according to Forbes’ 
Asian investment expert Ellen Sheng88. Sheng attributes this not only to the increase in 
China-U.S. investment from 11.7 billion U.S. Dollars in 2015 to 53.9 billion U.S. Dollars in 
2016, many of which in ‘sensitive’ sectors raising concerns over national security, but to the 
historically political investment practices of the CIC and the Chinese state in general89. 
 With a rise in CIC investment and historically politicised economic 
practices of the state, this case proves that SEF investment can have an impact on 
international political discourse both directly and indirectly, adding to the growing base of 
literature confirming the significance of politics in the investment practices of sovereign 
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wealth funds globally. As IPE theory professes, there has always and will always be a link 
between international politics and economics, scarcely more so than foreign direct 
investment, particularly when the investor and investees are either states or state entities 
themselves. 
VII. Case Study: Qatar Investment Authority 
As of July 2017 the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) is the 9th largest sovereign 
wealth fund in the world with total assets under management currently sitting at 335 billion 
UD dollars90. Founded in 2005 by the state of Qatar, it is an oil and natural gas subsidised 
fund intended to strengthen the Qatari economy through asset diversification with large 
investments in real-estate, energy and some $30 billion stocks worldwide. Other targeted 
investments include a 17% stake of the Volkswagen Group, 13% stake of Tiffany Co., 9% of 
Glencore, 6% of Barclays, 5% of Credit Suisse and 3.3% of Siemens91. 
Before the establishment of the Qatar Investment Authority in 2005 and activation in 
early 2006, the government of Qatar utilised a small investment team within its Ministry of 
Finance to invest primary commodity budget surplus. The recognition of the need for risk 
reduction through asset diversification came in the form of the Emiri Decision No. 22, 
directly from the then Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani92. The QIA took the place of the in-
house investment team, offering a superior platform for investment on a larger scale and with 
a greater scope. 
The QIA operates under a fairly standard organisational structure with a board of 
directors at its head, flanked by the investment committee and audit committee all reported to 
by the CEO, spreading down through the offices of the CFO and COO in addition to legal, 
investment, risk management and investment strategy departments. Subordinate offices 
below this third level of management largely run the day to day operations of the fund and all 
answer to their division line management offices93. 
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At the head of the fund as chairman of the board of directors, H.H. Sheikh Abdullah 
bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who is the current deputy emir of Qatar. Also on the board 
are several ministers, including the minister of economy and trade, H.E. Sheikh Ahmed bin 
Mohammed Al-Thani as vice chairman. Executing the administration of orders handed down 
from the board of directors in its day to day application is the CEO, H.E. Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Saud Al-Thani, a member of the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investment 
(SCEAI)94. 
The fund has a major role in the pursuit of the Qatar National Vision 2030, the state’s 
national development plan launched by the General Secretariat for Development Planning in 
200895. The QNV 2030 essentially focuses on sustainable development and the advancement 
of the state of Qatar to be tackled on four central pillars of social, human, environmental and 
economic development. The QIA plays a major role in the pursuit of sustainable economic 
development by enabling the state to diversify its economic risk profile beyond the 
dependence on oil and natural gas revenue. In fact, the QNV 2030 aims to shift the state’s 
revenue base from primary commodity dependency to an investment based economy using its 
commodity trade revenue to subsidise its investments96. 
With all of the information above, the QIA seems to fulfil a very standard role shared 
by many sovereign wealth funds to diversify assets in order to increase economic resilience. 
In order to uncover its relevance to political discourse one must look closer at the fund itself. 
Importantly, the QIA was one of the founding member funds of the GAPPs in 2008, 
and currently has its CEO, H.E. Sheikh Abdullah bin Saud Al-Thani, as a member of the 
board of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Despite this, though, the Qatar Investment 
Authority only scores a poor 5 points out of a possible 10 on the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index where the SWFI considers a minimum score of 8 points to be an 
acceptable level of sovereign wealth fund transparency97. Furthermore, the QIA has 
consistently received poor independent audit scores for compliance to the GAPPs which, 
ironically, the fund had a hand in creating. In 2014, GAPP compliance auditor Geoeconomica 
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released a report on the compliance ratings of 31 sovereign wealth funds from 25 states 
around the world. After the audit, each fund was assigned a letter based rating from A to D, 
with 4 funds not allocated a rating for lack of evidence. Funds which were found to be fully 
compliant were given an A rating, of which there were 9. B ratings were assigned to 9 funds 
which were found to be ‘broadly compliant and C ratings to 8 funds deemed ‘partially 
compliant.” The only fund to receive the absolute lowest rating possible, a D for ‘non-
compliant,’ was the Qatar Investment Authority98. 
Criticisms levelled against the QIA involved non-disclosure of true assets under 
management, not providing accurate annual investment reports to the public, unilateral 
decision making without consensus and a failure to publish or publicise an investment agenda 
or strategy99. With Qatar seeking to become a global investment hub, the poor compliance 
score may have deeper meanings and consequences than anticipated. 
In the first place, the GAPP’s were primarily established in the aim of addressing 
concerns that SWFs were becoming economically powerful enough entities to be able to 
influence political discourse and therefore could be used as a tool for political manipulation. 
That being said, without the pursuit of and dedication to achieving the highest possible 
degree of GAPP compliance, it undermines the principles as a whole. With some of the 
world’s most powerful SWFs such as the QIA actively choosing to defy the principles, the 
legitimacy of the whole initiative is called into question which may encourage other funds to 
follow their example. In fact, the choice to flout the GAPPs puts funds at a comparative 
advantage when compared to compliant funds as strict procedural and ethical boundaries can 
be avoided without disclosure or accountability. In the case of the QIA, with such a 
developed and well established fund, the negligence to comply with the GAPPs is entirely the 
result of a conscious decision to withhold information. This decision is surely a calculated 
one in which it was found that the benefits of non-disclosure outweigh the risk to its 
reputation and its legitimacy in its ignorance of the very principles it helped to create and 
which now hold other funds to a higher standard than its own. The implication, therefore, is 
																																								 																				
98	Sven	Behrendt,	Santiago	Compliance	Index	2014:	Assessing	the	Governence	Arrangements	and	Financial	
Disclosure	of	Global	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	(Geopolitica,	2014),	2.	
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjtzcj
op_TVAhWdHsAKHZmiC_sQFghXMAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.geoeconomica.com%2Findex.php%2Fanalys
es.html%3Ffile%3Dtl_files%2Fgeoeconomica%2Freports%2FSCI%25202014%2520October%25202014_final.pd
f&usg=AFQjCNHeBeOduvDstlphceUqZ_CS-rsZaA.	
99	Behrendt,	Santiago	Compliance	Index	2014:	Assessing	the	Governence	Arrangements	and	Financial	
Disclosure	of	Global	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	2-11.	
Philip	Patrick	Hawkins																								University	of	the	Witwatersrand																																														462569	
	 38	
that there are aspects of the fund which directly contradict the principles which would do 
more damage to the fund if exposed than the consequences of non-compliance with the 
GAPPs. 
Despite the fact that the QIA was one of the co-founding funds of the Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices, and continues to have representation on the board of the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the fund’s actions and objectives have been called into 
question on more than one occasion.  
Since its establishment, the QIA has amassed a multi-billion dollar portfolio of 
foreign investments throughout the world in both developed and developing states. Many of 
its most capital intensive investments have been executed within EU member states such as 
Britain and France, with increasing frequency and magnitude over the past 5 years or so100. 
Although difficult to criticise simply for the diversity of foreign investment, the mere fact 
that the QIA and therefore the state of Qatar is invested so deeply in the interconnected 
network of economic affairs in ‘Western’ states does most certainly afford it a considerable 
degree of ‘soft power.’ With several billion dollars of investment interest stemming from the 
state of Qatar, recipient states inevitably share vested interest in the preservation of political 
and economic ties or face divestment in economic entities on a scale large enough to impact 
on local economy and employment. 
Possibly the most significant debates on Qatar have revolved around two major 
topics, the first being its relationship with the regional powerhouse and Shiite state of Iran, 
and the second being more recently publicised is its possible financial support of terrorist 
groups in the Middle East. In the first case, the political identity and shared dominant religion 
of the two states in a region plagued by religious conflict is a logical political alliance. 
Diplomatic relations are important to both states as they share an enormous natural gas field 
from which each state draws billions of dollars to fund other initiatives101. The revenue 
generated from the extraction and sale of natural gas from this deposit significantly supports 
the base of funds which the QIA uses to make its investments. With Iran’s immense military 
capability, the tiny and militarily weak state of Qatar recognises the importance of 
maintaining amicable relations with its neighbouring giant. 
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More pertinent to the topic of this paper is the accusation levelled against Qatar by its 
fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members that the state was using government funds 
to support terrorist factions in the region. The significance of the accusation is multiplied by 
its source, primarily being Saudi Arabia. Historically, the GCC acted as a stabilising force in 
the region, promoting dialogue and at least some degree of cooperation amongst its members. 
It was established in 1981 in response to security concerns arising from conflict over the 
establishment of the state of Israel, the Iran-Iraq war and the spread of ‘radical Islam’ 
supported by the state of Iran. According to the office of the secretary general of the GCC, it 
sought to establish coordination and cooperation between its 6 member-states selected on the 
basis of their similar political systems based on the values of Islam102. The signatories are 
held to an agreement of mutual defence which includes joint defence and joint command 
networks which allows all member states to act collectively against aggression. The GCC 
also includes agreements of political and economic cooperation amongst member states, 
forming an allied block of similar states for collective security. More recently, the GCC has 
developed early warning systems and ballistic missile programmes operating in a network 
throughout the territories of the member states103. With the high level of interdependence 
among GCC states, particularly in the fields of economics, politics and defence, the small 
state of Qatar could be argued to have more to gain from its membership than some of its 
larger, more economically and militarily developed partner states. 
As early as 2014, tensions started brewing between Qatar and its 5 fellow GCC 
member states over its commitment to the council and its cause, accusing the state of 
pursuing nonconformist foreign policy with Iran and supporting extremist groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood104. In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE severed 
diplomatic ties with Qatar by withdrawing their respective ambassadors from Doha in protest 
of its role in the Arab Spring through the support of the Muslim Brotherhood which affected 
regime change in Egypt. Increasingly, the Qatari agenda seemed to shift to become more 
aligned with that of Iran. While Iran has never tried to conceal its support of numerous 
separatist organisations seeking to achieve regime change in the region, the state has had few 
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allies in doing so. By harbouring a growingly close political relationship with Iran, Qatar had 
positioned itself in conflict with its GCC mandate and turned to support the very factions of 
radical Islam for which it had initially sought security from by entering into the GCC in 
1981105. In a kind of political hedging, Qatar had been found in support of both the GCC and 
Iran, becoming increasingly involved with the strategic agenda of both, but not fully 
committed to either. By the end of 2014 Qatar had reached an agreement with the GCC and 
political ties resumed, if not tenuously106. 
Most recently, in mid-2017, the GCC once again severed ties with the state of Qatar 
in a Saudi-lead effort after evidence emerged of continuing support of terrorist organisations 
such as Al-Qaeda. Having developed only a few months prior to the writing of this paper, 
academic and government sources on the topic are limited to the media, however, when 
analysing such articles it is apparent that some members the GCC have now bolstered their 
stance on what they view as the Qatar problem. According to the Atlantic Council, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain have closed their borders and air space to, withdrawn their 
ambassadors from, and suspended economic dealings with the state of Qatar107. Among the 
reasons stated by Saudi Arabia for the action against Qatar is the Qatari backing of the Houthi 
separatist movement in Yemen who seek to overthrow the current Sunni regime. Further 
allegations extend to its support of armed groups in Libya and Syria both of which seeking 
control of their respective states. Qatar has also harboured individuals seen as enemies of its 
GCC states, such as the leader of the spiritual Muslim Brotherhood Sheikh Yusef al-
Qaradawi and members of Hamas108. 
Importantly, most of these accusations including those of the 2014 GCC crisis have 
involved Qatar’s economic backing of separatist groups attempting to take power through 
armed conflict. On July 15th 2017, the UAE’s ambassador to Washington stated that the Qatar 
Investment Authority has been used to fund terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa109. 
According to Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba, the QIA uses profit generated through large 
scale investments such as those in Europe and the U.S.A. to finance groups such as Hamas, 
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the Muslim Brotherhood and factions linked to Al-Qaeda in order to achieve regime change 
in line with Iranian objectives110. Essentially, this would mean that Qatar is using its 
sovereign wealth fund investments to launder monies to be given to armed groups 
circumventing direct payment through the state budget. While evidence of this was never 
presented during the 2014 GCC crisis, it would not be unreasonable to draw the same 
conclusion. 
By using its sovereign wealth fund to finance armed rebellion seeking to affect 
political change, the QIA directly violates its agreement to the GAPPs. This would explain 
the lack of transparency and poor audit reports received throughout its existence. As such, 
this case offers unequivocal evidence that sovereign wealth fund investments can be, and are 
being, used to manipulate global politics. As with each of the cases in this study, the state (or 
political party in the Chilean case) has been able to implement political changes for its own 
gains by using SWF investment, albeit a lot more aggressively in the case of Qatar. Finally, 
being that the GCC-Qatar crisis is still underway at the time of this papers composition, one 
can assume that far more evidence will surface and become publically available as the crisis 
plays out and will then lead to far more concrete evidence and academic analysis on the topic. 
As of now, though, the evidence paints a rather incriminating picture of Qatar and of the 
QIA. 
Conclusion 
With sovereign wealth fund investment featuring prominently in global economics at 
present, it is important to consider the way in which it has affected the industry. The 
exponential growth in the number and value of SWF investments around the world has given 
rise to a wealth of information on topic across the disciplines of economics and politics alike. 
Among the range of sources are important selections that focus specifically on the 
relationship between the political and economic aspects of this investment class. 
The fact that SWF investments are by nature state funded, state owned and mostly 
state operated institutions which specialise in financial investments across the full range of 
economic investment opportunities from hedge funds to state bonds, means that there is an 
inarguable political aspect to SWF investment. This report set out to prove the existence of 
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that relationship and to investigate the extent to which the economic activities of sovereign 
wealth fund investment can have an effect on domestic and international politics. 
The first step in this investigation was to set a perspective in the form of a theoretical 
framework that could be used as a viewpoint for the entire investigation. Considering the 
topic, the theory of International Political Economics was chosen as the primary theory for 
the research. Each case was then assigned a more specific theory within the greater realm of 
IPE theory in order to provide the most relevant theoretical perspective to use in each case. 
A short history and an analysis of the ‘Santiago Principles’ was then discussed, which 
allowed for the research to be placed in the context of SWF political economics and the best 
practices for which each fund should strive to achieve. 
In order to properly identify the political effects of the chosen sovereign wealth fund 
investments in each of the case study, a method of classification was established in the 
paragraph “Identifying Political Influence.” Through the process of the initial analysis of the 
subject material, it was noticed that there are only truly two categories each with two sub-
categories distinguishable in cases related to the topic. The two main categories identified the 
scale on which SWF investment was able to influence political discourse, observable on 
either a domestic or an international scale. Each of these categories was able to be further 
defined by the direction of influence, that is to say, the observation of influence taking place 
either as a result of SWF investment itself or as a result of political action which then 
influences SWF investment. 
Having established the basis and structure of the study, the three case studies were 
analysed in detail. An intensive analysis was conducted of the Chilean funds, the Social and 
Economic Stabilisation Fund and the Pension Reserve fund. By looking at the timeline of 
political events and public opinion of economic governance in Chile, the study revealed a 
pattern of highs and lows mirroring the economic performance relative to that of the global 
average. During the first two years of the Bachelet administration the Chilean government 
faced dwindling public support, mass protests and general public disapproval of the 
government as a whole. The slump in public support began around the same time as the 
Bachelet government announced its political and economic doctrine and plans directly after 
taking office. Part of that announcement was the initiation of the two SWFs which was not 
well received by local media who seemed to believe that the funds deposited into these funds 
should have been used to address poverty and infrastructural deficits. The tone quickly 
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changed, though, with the arrival of the global economic recession. The SWFs were used 
responsibly and effectively by the state of Chile to offset budget deficits brought on by the 
low price and demand for copper globally. The Pension Reserve Fund was used to 
supplement the income of those citizens negatively affected by the recession, which did a lot 
to restore faith in the government at the time. Public opinion soared as the copper exporting 
state, for the first time, faired exceptionally well through the recession as compared to other 
states around the world. Along with heightened public opinion of the state by its citizens, 
Chile also saw greater social stability than expected during a financial crisis. Notwithstanding 
the tensions which arose in the Chilean parliament and subsequent defection of party 
members over corruption and misappropriation issues, the activities of the two SWF 
investments and resulting public support was seen as a massive political victory for the 
Bachelet administration. It has also been credited with the considerably high level of public 
support which resulted in Bachelet’s re-election in 2014.  
This case study proved the hypothesis that SWF investment can influence politics on 
a domestic level, even in cases when there is no direct political intention to do so. 
The second case study analysed the investment activities of the China Investment 
Corporation. Being one of the largest sovereign wealth funds on earth and boasting one of the 
most rapid growth rates of any SWF investment, this proved a to be a valuable case for the 
purposes of the investigation. Apart from the financial side of the CIC, it also belongs to 
China which operates under very different political circumstances to those of Chile. The 
different political backgrounds, purposes and investment strategies of the two cases allowed 
for a well-rounded and broadly representative study. This case found that there were most 
certainly political motives behind at least a portion of the investment activities undertaken by 
the CIC. The political motivation behind the investments executed by the CIC prove the 
relative impotence of the GAPPs at least for funds belonging to states with non-democratic 
and often fiercely geostrategically based political backgrounds. 
Importantly, the investigation of the politics associated with the investment actions of 
the CIC brought to light a secondary effect possible in this class of investment. Having grown 
in size and number so rapidly and mainly among non-Western states, a wave of distrust and 
contempt towards SWF direct investments in Western states emerged. This can also be 
attributed to dubious investment behaviour on the part of funds such as the CIC which eroded 
trust in the purposes and intentions of these investments. The end result was the 
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implementation of economically proactivist policies and regulatory bodies within investment 
receiving states such as the U.S.  
In addition to the rise of domestic economic protectionism among these states, the 
suspicion and perception of threat originating from SWF investments lead to calls for 
regulation and standards to which all SWFs should abide. With that, the IMF instituted the 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP or Santiago Principles). The GAPP’s set 
standards to which all SWFs should abide, advocating transparency, responsible and ethical 
investment, and separation of politics and SWF investment. This was necessitated, of course, 
by the very activities undertaken by state investment institutions such as the CIC, which 
would transgress against the GAPPs. As such, the GAPPs are further proof of the political 
effects of SWF investment activities. 
The third and final case study focused on the Qatar Investment Authority. The study 
focused on establishing a background for the case, identifying its relationship with the 
formation and implementation of the GAPPs, its turbulent relationship with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and finally on its use of the fund to financially support armed conflict in 
the region for the purpose of affecting political change. The investigation found that the fund 
had been used by the state of Qatar to manipulate politics in the region by way of financial 
support of third parties in the form of armed factions. This case proves that SWF investments 
can be, and are being, used as a tool for the manipulation of politics in spite of the GAPPs 
and global and regional pressure. 
The Culmination of this investigation successfully answers the question pertaining to 
the existence and extent of politics in SWF investment. The findings state with certainty that 
there is a clear and inarguable political aspect in sovereign wealth fund investment, and that 
these effects can be deliberate or coincidental, domestic and/or international and can impact 
investor states, investee states and even states not directly involved in specific SWF 
investment activities through regulatory reactions to SWF investment activities. 
Despite the success of this study, there are some limitations. Given the relatively 
small sample size, there is large degree of variability as the cases change. Furthermore, the 
relatively limited pool of academically acceptable resources compared to other topics, this 
study relies heavily on a fairly limited base of knowledge and sources of information. Having 
said that, the selection of these resources and cases is the result of deeply considered 
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intensive preliminary research and therefore should be presented to be reliable and 
scientifically viable. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Public Opinion of Economic Governance in Chile 
 
(Gonzalez, R., (2013), “Estudio Nacional se Opinion Publica No. 70,” Centro de Estudios 
Publicos, Sanriago, 
https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/artic/20160304/asocfile/20160304100356/encuestaCEP_sep-
oct2013.pdf, accessed 18/08/2016.) 
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Appendix B: Graph Showing a Conglomeration of Sources on Chinese Foreign Investment 
Destinations and Negative Sentiment Toward Chinese Economic Power in Recipient States  
 
(“Streaks of Red: Capital and Companies from China are Sidling into Europe,” The 
Economist, June 30, 2011, online article, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18895430?zid=293&ah=e50f636873b42369614615ba3c16d
f4a.) 
(Richard Anderson, “What Does China Own in Britain?” British Broadcasting Corporation, 
October 14, 2013, online article, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24473933.) 
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